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As Professor Ray Campbell stated in his remarks at this
symposium,' Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 may be the Supreme Court case that
launched a thousand law review articles. Although a statement like that
is usually meant to imply that too much ink is being spilled on a subject,
in this case the game is worth the candle. Civil pleading rules play a
central role in the rule of law in any legal system. Determining who is
allowed to invoke the machinery of the civil justice system, and under
what circumstance they may do so, lies at the core of how a system of
law defines itself. The papers in this symposium outline how Iqbal has
the potential to change the very purposes of the system of civil justice
and give some glimpse into why such a change has come about.
The rules of pleadings are critical to the rule of law in a civil justice
system because of what it means to assess a case on the pleadings.
Dismissing a case at the pleadings phase of litigation means that the
plaintiff will not have access to the mechanisms of discovery to uncover
evidence that might support her claims. When a plaintiffs claims fail to
identify any legal theory that a system recognizes as allowing recovery,
this might seem appropriate. After all, before a case is filed a plaintiff
can conduct whatever research lies within her means to identify a legal
theory that supports her claims; if she cannot identify one before the
lawsuit begins, then it is hard to see why she could identify one
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Professor Ray W. Campbell, Remarks at the Pennsylvania State University Law
Review Symposium (Mar. 26, 2010).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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afterwards. But Iqbal requires more from a plaintiff. Iqbal requires that
a plaintiff convince a trial judge that her claims are apt to have factual
support-that they are plausible.3 Without the ability to use civil
discovery to support her case, a plaintiff might not have the facts she
needs to make her claims seem plausible.
All systems of civil pleading must grapple with the issues Iqbal
raises. They must strike a balance between open access to the courts and
the costs of the civil justice system. Allowing plaintiffs to have easy
access to the tools of discovery to investigate and demonstrate
wrongdoing by defendants is useful in any system, but also expensive.
Easy access to the courts allows for the possibility that plaintiffs might
file nuisance suits only for settlement value. Plaintiffs might simply be
harassing defendants or engaging in fishing expeditions on the mere
possibility that a thorough investigation just might uncover some
evidence of wrongdoing. Rules of pleading strike the balance.
In striking a balance between access to discovery for plaintiffs and
the potential burdens imposed on defendants, a civil justice system does
not merely assess costs, it makes a broader social judgment. Requiring
that plaintiffs make claims that are factually plausible raises the potential
that wrongdoing will go without redress. Under Iqbal, cases in which the
defendant's documents or witnesses are essential to convincing a trial
judge that the case is plausible are apt to be dismissed. Plaintiffs have
less ability to uncover wrongdoing after Iqbal than before.
In whole categories of cases, plaintiffs might be wholly unable to
identify facts that would support their case without first using the tools
that discovery makes available. Consider how difficult it is to plead facts
in a products liability case in which the plaintiff was injured by a product
that exploded or burned, thereby simultaneously injuring the plaintiff and
destroying most of the available evidence. Or consider the impediments
civil rights plaintiffs face when suing a police department for wrongfully
searching their home. Such plaintiffs may know little more than that
they are innocent and that the police nevertheless showed up at their
doorstep and ransacked their residence. Or consider the difficulty of
plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits, confronting what they
believe to be a wrongful termination, but knowing only that they were
fired with an explanation that seemed inadequate. Without the ability to
command the defendant to answer interrogatories, produce documents,
and attend depositions, making such a case seem plausible will now
3. Id. at 1949 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."')
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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depend upon the skill of an attorney in telling the plaintiffs story in a
way that convinces a judge that the plaintiff s claims are possible.
Among the many paths to success available to defendants, 1qbal
thus adds the possibility that their wrongdoing is so outrageous that it
seems implausible, at least without evidence buried in the documents.
Iqbal's heightened pleading standard thus implicitly embraces a faith
either that those who are apt to find themselves to be defendants are
generally not engaged in conduct that demands scrutiny, or that
mechanisms other than a civil justice process driven by private
individuals will keep them in line.
Iqbal's disruption of the balance underlying the civil justice system
is the essence of why the case will rightly spawn a blizzard of
commentary. Among the issues it raises is the puzzle of why the balance
concerning pleadings has to be struck differently now. In this
commentary, I outline this puzzle in the first section below. The timing
of Iqbal is particularly odd considering that the problems that its holding
seems intended to address are not new ones. In Part II, I note that the
papers in this symposium, along with a few other factors influencing the
federal judiciary and the Supreme Court, help answer this puzzle. I
conclude that Iqbal reflects a new faith in institutions and organizations.
I. THE PUZZLING TIMING OF THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING'S ARRIVAL
Among the many puzzles Iqbal presents, the question of why the
Supreme Court has adopted heighted pleading at this moment stands out.
Any change in the approach to pleading likely reflects some evolution of
beliefs about the virtues and vices of open access to the courts. Any
effort to restrict access to civil discovery likely reflects the belief that
allowing individuals to investigate potential wrongdoing among
institutions has become too costly. As I discuss in this section, this
attitude likely now predominates the thinking of both the Justices on the
Supreme Court and many lower court judges, thereby creating an
environment in which Iqbal makes sense to those who administer the
system of civil justice.
The concern that notice pleading represents an inefficient and costly
system certainly reflects a change from the attitudes that motivated the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1930's. At that
time, notice pleading was heralded as a breathtaking, but welcome
reform.4 The Federal Rules represented a deliberate effort to lower
4. See B.H. Carey, In Favor of Uniformity, 3 F.R.D. 505, 507 (1943) (calling the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "one of the greatest contributions to the free and
unhampered administration of law and justice ever struck off by any group of men since
the dawn of civilized law").
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barriers to filing lawsuits and pursuing discovery to support a claim.5
The Rules originally embraced simplicity in pleading. This was meant to
facilitate access to discovery and produce outcomes that better reflected
the merits of the claims, rather than the abilities of the advocates to
navigate a cumbersome system of pleadings. The reforms that Rules
embraced reflected a faith in individualism and professionalism.
Attorneys could be trusted to pursue claims that are apt to have merit.
The Rules envisioned that litigation that followed the pleadings would
consist of the parties engaging in a largely unsupervised investigation of
each other.
Although this change was much celebrated when adopted (at least
by those who drafted the Rules), times change. By the late 1970's
significant discussion of the potential problems with the system
emerged.6 Concerns about the costs of discovery had grown, especially
in large, complex civil cases. Although scholars marked the concern that
litigation was too costly for individual plaintiffs,7 most of the concern
about the cost of litigation was raised by or on behalf of institutional
defendants.
Generally speaking, the combination of low pleading standards and
costly discovery presents two basic problems for a potential defendant.
First, plaintiffs can file suits brought only for the purpose of extracting a
nuisance settlement.8 Plaintiffs face little cost in doing so, and
defendants face being blackmailed into buying their way out of the costs
of the discovery process, even if the underlying claim has no merit.
Second, even plaintiffs who are not pursuing frivolous claims can still
impose enormous costs on defendants. These concerns become
particularly acute in cases in which the costs are asymmetric. That is,
5. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REv. 821, 825 (2010) (stating that under the Federal Rules, the
"main task [of pleading] was to give fair notice of the pleader's basic contentions to the
adversary" and that "[i]t passed most of the screening function from the threshold to later
stages of litigation").
6. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1315 (1978) (reviewing evidence on
discovery and concluding that the adversary forces that shape civil litigation do not
"justify any confidence that the structure of our civil litigation system will provide a fair
and efficient framework for conflict resolution").
7. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the
Limits ofLegal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 120-21 (1974) (arguing that "the broader
the delegation to the parties, the greater the advantage conferred on the wealthier").
8. See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value," 5 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985) (stating that when a plaintiff with
a weak case files a claim, the defendant is placed in a position where "the defendant
should be willing to pay a positive amount in settlement to the plaintiff with the weak
case-despite the defendant's knowledge that were he to defend himself, such a plaintiff
would withdraw").
[Vol. 114:41250
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some cases present the potential for discovery to be incredibly expensive
to a defendant, but relatively costless to the plaintiff. Class action suits
against manufacturers, consumer fraud class actions, litigation brought
under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and
litigation by prisoners all represent examples of asymmetric litigation in
which the plaintiffs face far fewer costs from discovery than the
defendants, and hence might have incentives to bring nuisance suits. The
twin specters of frivolous litigation and discovery costs tend to run
amuck in asymmetric litigation and have haunted the Federal Rules for
decades.9
But Iqbal's embrace of heightened pleading cannot be attributed
solely to concerns about the costs of litigation. The concerns about the
supposed litigation explosion, frivolous suits against government officers
and corporations, and the boundless costs of discovery are not new-
they have been around for decades. Concerns about asymmetric
litigation lie at the heart of Iqbal, but something in the contemporary
environment must have inspired this particular reform.
Whatever inspired heightened pleading at this moment in time, it is
not likely a result of accumulated pressures of unrequited desires for
reform. Calls to address the costs of litigation have hardly gone
unheeded. These concerns produced a series of reforms meant both to
deter frivolous litigation practices and reduce the costs of discovery. In
1983, and again in 1993, Rule 11 was altered so as to empower judges to
penalize litigants for filing or maintaining frivolous lawsuits or
motions.'o Rule 16 was amended to encourage judges to manage cases
actively." The discovery rules themselves were amended multiple times
to reduce the cost of discovery. 12  Statutory reforms in the 1990's
brought heightened pleading requirements to cases thought to create
9. Rhetoric about costly litigation has been around for decades. See generally, e.g.,
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (Penguin Group 1991).
10. See FED. R. Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note on 1983 amendments ("Greater
attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of
sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.").
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note on 1983 amendments ("[T]here
is evidence that pretrial conferences may improve the quality of justice rendered in the
federal courts by sharpening the preparation and presentation of cases .... ).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note on 1993 amendments (noting
that the "major purpose of the revision is to accelerate the exchange of basic information
about the case and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information").
2010] 1251
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asymmetric litigation strategies, including Prisoner's rights cases13 and
claims under Federal securities laws.14
The concerns about the costs of litigation and the presence of
nuisance suits are thus an entrenched part of the rhetoric of civil justice
reform. But this history only deepens the puzzle. Why has the long
backlash against notice pleading finally gotten enough traction to inspire
a wholesale retreat from the concept after all this time? And why have
past notice pleading and discovery reforms suddenly been deemed to be
inadequate?
II. CLUES TO IQBAL'S TIMING
The other issues raised by Iqbal provide some clues as to the answer
to the question of why the Court has suddenly chosen to embrace
heightened pleading. In addition to the heightened pleading requirement,
Professor Brown's and Professor Pfander's contributions to this
symposium note that the case also extends the collateral order rule,
thereby facilitating greater intervention by the appellate courts into
factual matters normally assessed by the trial courts." The case
effectively extends the willingness the court expressed in Scott v.
Harris1 6 to engage in fact-finding on appeal. Professor Kinports' paper
in this symposium notes that Iqbal's pronouncements on the doctrine of
supervisory immunity also provide a greater shield to officers of the
federal government from judicial scrutiny.17 Combined with its creation
of a heightened pleading standard, the Court overall seems to bristle at
the notion of subjecting high officers to even the most indirect
supervision that would accompany discovery. As Professor Romero
notes, the case thus provides greater deference to governmental actors.18
An assessment of the various parts of Iqbal's holding thus reveals a
unifying theme: reluctance to allow individuals to use access to the
courts (and discovery) as a means of scrutinizing institutional actors.
Iqbal's recent predecessors, Scott v. Harris and Bell Atlantic v.
13. Such cases typically involved the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
14. Such cases typically involved the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
15. James Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role ofJudge-Made Law in Constitutional
Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1387 (2010); Mark R. Brown, Qualified Immunity and
Interlocutory Fact Finding in the Courts ofAppeals, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1317 (2010).
16. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
17. Kit Kinports, Iqbal and Supervisory Immunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1291
(2010).
18. Victor C. Romero, Interrogating Iqbal: Intent, Inertia, and (a Lack of)
Imagination, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1419 (2010).
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Twombly,' 9 similarly embrace deference to institutional actors. Iqbal's
holding itself benefits agencies of the federal government most directly,
extending the kind of deference Scott v. Harris provided to local law
enforcement.20 And Twombly reduced the ability of individuals to use
notice pleading of the antitrust laws to investigate the possibility of
corporate misconduct in the marketplace.2 1 The holdings reflect a faith
that actors in the large institutional settings of the federal government
and corporate structures are worthy of some measure of trust. A Court
that believes that these institutions will largely operate in a forthright,
honest fashion will be more apt to think of these private lawsuits as
frivolous and unnecessary. Notice pleading ensures private individuals
will have the means to investigate potential wrongdoing within these
institutions. It provides, as Professor Welsh notes in this volume, an
opportunity for individuals to have a place at the negotiating table.22
Heightened pleading renders such investigations more difficult to
undertake and places these efforts more squarely under the control of the
judiciary-particularly the appellate courts. If institutional actors and
judges are thought to be generally worthy of trust, then private
investigations that arise through civil discovery are apt to be
unnecessary.
This theme of heightened deference to institutional actors provides
one possible answer to the question of why the court feels that the time
has come for heightened pleading. The concerns about costly discovery
or nuisance suits might not be the primary motivation for the new
pleading standard; those concerns have been around for decades and
have inspired other reforms. It is not that the landscape of civil litigation
has changed so much as the perspective of the members of the judiciary
has changed. Under this understanding of the case, Iqbal arose from a
new belief in the importance of deference to institutional actors, rather
than form a new understanding of the costs of discovery.
Other aspects of Iqbal also support the thesis that great faith in
institutional actors motivated the the Court's holding Iqbal's holding
19. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
20. See Kinports, supra note 17, at 1291.
21. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority
opinion does not require "knowledgeable executives ... to respond to these allegations
by way of sworn depositions or other limited discovery . . [but instead], permits
immediate dismissal based on the assurances of company lawyers that nothing untoward
was afoot").
22. Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been A Contender: Summary Jury Trial as a
Means to Overcome Iqbal's Negative Effects Upon Pre-Litigation Communication,
Negotiation and Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1149
(2010) (noting that the Iqbal holding will have the effect of "effectively undermining
such institutions' motivation to negotiate, mediate--or even communicate and listen to-
[individual] claimants").
2010] 1253
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arises from the events of 9/11 and echoes past deference on national
security matters in times of crisis. As Professor Wadhia's paper in this
symposium notes, Iqbal echoes past deference on national security
matters in times of crisis, even to the point of sacrificing civil rights.23
Of course, Scott v Harris and Twombly have no such connections, but the
holdings in these cases are less capacious than Iqbal. It seems a
remarkable coincidence that the one case that clearly establishes
heightened pleading in the Federal Courts was brought by a Guantanamo
Bay detainee against the Attorney General who was a leader of the Bush
Administration's response to 9/11. The circumstances of the case make
it abundantly clear that a system of notice pleading would allow even an
accused terrorist to launch a largely unsupervised investigation of the
nation's terrorism policies. Threatening events like terrorism and war
engender trust in domestic institutions-a trust which apparently can
easily spread beyond the context of a single case.
Furthermore, the federal judiciary is increasingly staffed with
former institutional actors-largely prosecutors.24 The clearest pathway
to a federal judgeship is by working as a U.S. Attorney or in corporate
practice. Lawyers whose practice focuses on individual plaintiffs are
rarely considered for new federal judgeships. The judiciary has thus
become an entity that is staffed with individuals who have some faith in
the institutions of government, having spent much of their time working
for the government. And private practice for many judges has consisted
of big firm, corporate work. Although one can only speculate about the
influence that these trends will have, this career path likely undermines
the belief that privately implemented civil litigation against institutional
actors is not an essential component of the rule of law. Even if they
opposed the Bush Administration's approach to addressing terrorism,
such actors are unlikely to believe that private litigation by Guantanamo
detainees is the most effective means of changing policies. More likely,
institutional actors prefer institutional reforms.
Another new aspect of the judiciary is the extent to which judges,
especially the Supreme Court justices, are exposed to alternative legal
systems. This includes the Continental System, as documented by
Professor Maxeiner's paper.25 Assertions that alternative civil justice
23. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the National
Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1485 (2010).
24. See generally Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998)
(discussing the demographics and ideological perspective ofjudges).
25. James Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and
Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, A Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 1257 (2010).
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systems, especially the continental (and especially the German), have
advantages are almost as old as calls for reforming the cost of
26discovery. But there is an enormous difference between reading about
a different system and hearing it described firsthand by a peer jurist from
that system. The Supreme Court justices might also increasingly be
influenced by exposure to the judge-controlled civil litigation procedures
in other countries, as the justices frequently meet with their international
27
counterparts. Numerous international conferences put the U.S. justices
in the same room as their counterparts in systems that have never
embraced notice pleading. The U.S. justices have surely observed that
their international counterparts preside over perfectly lawful, well-
developed legal systems that demand more than notice pleading from
their plaintiffs in civil systems.
Finally, it must also be noted that notice pleading might well have
been largely a dying concept even before Iqbal. Reforms to the
discovery rules encourage plaintiffs to plead facts so as to facilitate
disclosure under Rule 26. The ubiquity of judicial conferences under
Rule 16 also encourages plaintiffs to draft complaints that tell their story,
so that the when they meet with a judge or magistrate judge, that judge
can easily understand their side of the story. And the willingness of
courts to contemplate motions for summary judgment early in a lawsuit's
history means that a plaintiff might have to rely on facts pled in the
pleading to continue conducting discovery. These factors have been
conspiring against the concept of simple notice pleading for decades. To
judges who are used to seeing lengthy, fact-laden complaints, Iqbal
might seem a small change.
Taken together, the circumstances that gave rise to the Iqbal
decision can be understood as a confluence of events. Judges who
themselves spent most of their careers in loyal and honest service to
institutions might feel little need to allow open-ended investigations of
these institutions by private actors, absent some overt evidence of
wrongdoing. An increasingly global perspective on the role of courts
and judges helps this view along, as the system of notice pleading and
generally unsupervised discovery is highly unusual. The events of 9/11
and a discomfort with scrutinizing the institutions that are charged with
defending against terror attacks complete the picture. Requiring that
plaintiffs make out plausible claims before proceeding on to discovery
suddenly feels like an idea whose time has come.
26. See generally, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985).
27. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 96-99 (Princeton
University Press 2004) (documenting the increasing tendency of high-court judges to
meet face-to-face at international conferences).
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III. CONCLUSION
Iqbal is a product of its time. It arose in an environment in which
notice pleading may be long past its expiration date, having been chipped
away by numerous reforms. It is the work of a highly confident Court-
indeed, as Professor Gildin's paper notes, one that might have reached
beyond the scope of the issues argued.28 The opinion expresses
confidence in the courts in general and in institutional actors. Only the
passage of time and experience with the new system of pleading will tell
us whether this confidence is warranted.
28. Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court's Legislative Agenda to Free Government
from Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN Sr. L. REv. 1333 (2010).
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